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Abstract – Evolution is based on the assumption that competing players update their strategies
to increase their individual payoﬀs. However, while the applied updating method can be diﬀerent,
most of previous works proposed uniform models where players use identical way to revise their
strategies. In this work we explore how imitation-based or learning attitude and innovation-based
or myopic best-response attitude compete for space in a complex model where both attitudes
are available. In the absence of additional cost the best response trait practically dominates the
whole snow-drift game parameter space which is in agreement with the average payoﬀ diﬀerence of
basic models. When additional cost is involved then the imitation attitude can gradually invade
the whole parameter space but this transition happens in a highly nontrivial way. However,
the role of competing attitudes is reversed in the stag-hunt parameter space where imitation is
more successful in general. Interestingly, a four-state solution can be observed for the latter
game which is a consequence of an emerging cyclic dominance between possible states. These
phenomena can be understood by analyzing the microscopic invasion processes, which reveals the
unequal propagation velocities of strategies and attitudes.
Copyright c© EPLA, 2018
To imitate a more successful strategy is a frequently
applied microscopic rule within the framework of evolu-
tionary game theoretical models which focus on the funda-
mental conﬂict of individual and community beneﬁts [1,2].
This assumption is partly motivated by biological systems
where payoﬀ is interpreted as ﬁtness or reproductive suc-
cess [3]. Considering more sophisticated human systems,
where similar social dilemmas are on stage, there are other
alternative suggestions for strategy updating rules that
take account of cognitive skills of competitors. During
the last decades theoretical models have raised several
ways how to update strategies including myopic best re-
sponse [4–8], learning, or reinforcement learning strate-
gies [9–17]. In parallel, a huge number of experimental
works have been published, but sometimes their conclu-
sions are conﬂicting which make diﬃcult the comparison
with theoretical predictions [18–21].
One of the possible reasons of contradicting experimen-
tal results could be that we cannot be fully sure what
is the microscopic motivation of individual competitors
when they update their strategies. Furthermore the simul-
taneous presence of diﬀerent updating traits or attitudes
cannot be excluded, which makes the evaluation of dif-
ferent external conditions even harder. Interestingly, this
fact has been largely ignored by theoretical works because
most of them assume uniform players in the sense that
they all apply the same method or attitude to revise their
present states. In this letter we consider a simple model
where two conceptually diﬀerent attitudes are available
for individuals who try to reach a higher payoﬀ. These
strategy updating methods are based on imitation or in-
novation and players are using one of them during a micro-
scopic step. Beside heterogeneous attitudes we also extend
the basic models by considering the fact that applying
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a certain attitude may be costly. For example, innovation
requires additional investment from a player or imitation
assumes a permanent eﬀort to monitor others’ activity and
score their success. These eﬀects can be modeled by con-
sidering an additional cost to a speciﬁc attitude [22–26].
As we will show, even a very simple model can provide
a highly complex behavior and the viability of a certain
attitude or strategy updating method depends sensitively
on the model parameters. Furthermore, their relation may
change repeatedly by varying only a single parameter, but
without changing the original character of a certain social
dilemma.
We consider pairwise social games where mutual coop-
eration provides the reward R = 1, mutual defection leads
to punishment P = 0. The remaining two payoﬀ values
are free parameters of our model to navigate among diﬀer-
ent dilemma situations. These are the sucker’s payoﬀ S of
a cooperator against a defector and the temptation value
T for the latter player. For simplicity we assume that
players are distributed on a square lattice with periodic
boundaries where every player interacts with four nearest
neighbors when total payoﬀ is calculated. Nevertheless,
we stress that our main ﬁndings remain unchanged if we
use diﬀerent interaction topologies including triangle and
hexagonal lattices or random network.
In addition to the mentioned C and D strategies players
are also characterized by a special attitude or trait which
determines how they revise their strategies. If a player x is
described by the trait imitation (IM) then she adopts the
strategy sy from a neighboring y player with a probability
W (sx → sy) = (1 + exp[(Πx − Πy)/K])−1, (1)
where Π denotes the accumulated payoﬀ values gained
from two-player games with nearest neighbors. This sum
is reduced by an attitude-speciﬁc cost of focal player. In
particular, an imitating player bears an additional IM
cost, while a player who uses (myopic) best response (BR)
to update her strategy should bear BR. The remaining
parameter K determines the noise level of the imitation
process. In the alternative case, when the x player’s atti-
tude is characterized by (myopic) best response to update
her strategy, then she changes her sx strategy to s′x with
a probability
Γ(sx → s′x) = (1 + exp[(Πx − Π′x)/K])−1, (2)
where Πx and Π′x are the income of player x when playing
sx and s′x for the given neighborhood. For simplicity we
applied the same noise level as for the above-described
imitation process.
Since our principal interest to explore how diﬀerent at-
titudes compete we also allow the individual attitude to
change. When this microscopic process is executed, which
is independent of the previously speciﬁed strategy update,
we assume that a player y forces her attitude or individ-
ual trait upon a neighboring player x with the probability
deﬁned by eq. (1). Technically we thus have a four-state
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Fig. 1: (Color online) Border lines on the T -S plane of the
snow-drift game separating the regions where either imitation
(IM) or best-response (BR) attitude dominates. Panel (a)
shows the borders calculated from the payoﬀ diﬀerences of
basic models where either imitation or best-response strategy
update is used exclusively. Panel (b) denotes the phase bound-
aries resulted from the complex model where both attitudes are
present in the initial states. BR = IM = 0 are used for both
panels. The applied K noise levels are denoted in the legend.
model, where strategy and individual attitude coevolve
during the evolutionary process.
We have performed Monte Carlo simulations and mon-
itored the fractions of strategies and attitudes. If players’
attitudes reached a uniform state we terminated the sim-
ulation because the system becomes equivalent to a basic
model where either imitation or best-response rule is used
exclusively to update individual strategies [7]. Similarly,
if the strategy distribution becomes uniform because ei-
ther C or D strategy goes extinct then we also stopped
simulation. In the latter case further evolution becomes
uninteresting because in the absence of diﬀerent strategies
the competition of attitudes is determined by their addi-
tional costs or, if these are equal, the dynamics resembles
to the voter-model–like dynamics [27,28]. This explains
why we only consider snow-drift and stag-hunt games and
leave prisoner’s dilemma game out. Namely, in the latter
case the system practically terminates onto a full defec-
tion state and this destination can only be avoided if we
assume additional mechanisms [29–31]. But the scope of
the present work is to explore the possible consequence
of simultaneous attitudes hence we keep the original basic
model without considering further mechanisms.
First we summarize our observations obtained for the
snow-drift game when no additional costs of attitudes are
considered. Figure 1(b) highlights that if the T value is
close to 1, which means that the temptation to defect is
small, then the imitation attitude will spread in the whole
system during the coevolutionary process. But for high
T temptation values the evolutionary outcome is reversed
and the best response attitude crowds out the alternative
trait. This observation is in close agreement with the pre-
diction based on the comparison of average payoﬀ values
of basic models where only uniform attitude is applied.
This comparison is plotted in ﬁg. 1(a) where higher payoﬀ
can be reached by applying imitation dynamics at low T
values, but the best-response attitude oﬀers a higher gen-
eral payoﬀ for individuals when we increase the temptation
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Fig. 2: (Color online) Eﬃciency of microscopic invasion pro-
cesses between diﬀerent states in dependence on S at ﬁxed
T = 1.1 for K = 0.1 when no additional costs are considered
(IM = BR = 0). Only those steps are shown which modify
the fractions of competing attitudes. The borders of diﬀerent
phases are marked by dashed vertical lines. While panel (a)
shows the details of speciﬁc elementary invasions as described
by the legend, panel (b) shows their accumulated values which
determine the ﬁnal outcome of competition. For better clarity
we have used I for IM and B for BR players in the legend
where elementary invasion processes are speciﬁed.
value. Interestingly, the payoﬀ diﬀerence is practically in-
dependent of the applied noise value, but the latter has
a signiﬁcant impact on the phase boundary when atti-
tudes properly compete. As ﬁg. 1(b) shows the higher the
noise value the smaller the parameter space where imita-
tion can dominate. This phenomenon can be understood
if we consider that the error in imitation will always de-
stroy the eﬃciency of homogeneous cooperator domains,
while this error has no real impact on the role-separating
arrangement of C-D pairs when the best-response attitude
is at work.
Figure 1(b) also shows that there is a reentrant phase
transition from BR to IM to the BR phase as we in-
crease the S value at speciﬁc ﬁxed T values. This behavior
is a straightforward consequence of the relation of coop-
erator players having diﬀerent attitudes. At high S the
payoﬀ of a cooperator using the best response becomes
competitive with the payoﬀ of defectors hence the former
BC player can resist the invasion of the imitation attitude.
Similarly, a small positive S value also provides a stable
support to BC players to maintain the checkerboard-like
pattern of the best-response phase. They can resist the in-
vasion of IC imitator cooperators whose low density in the
IM phase makes them vulnerable. Between these extreme
cases the relatively high S provides a competitive payoﬀ
for IC players whose higher density makes the whole IM
phase strong. To conﬁrm this argument in ﬁg. 2(a) we
have plotted the diﬀerences of elementary invasion steps
for all cases where players invade a neighboring site that
was occupied previously by a diﬀerent attitude. This panel
shows clearly the non-monotonous change between IC and
BC states which is mainly responsible for the observed
reentrant transition.
From ﬁg. 1(b) we can conclude that the best-response
attitude can practically dominate the majority of the
snow-drift quadrant because the emerging role-separating
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Fig. 3: (Color online) Phase diagrams on the T -S plane for
diﬀerent cost values of the best-response update rule while the
cost of imitation strategy update remained IM = 0. The
former cost is BR = 0, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.25 for panel (a) to
panel (d), respectively. Here orange (green) denotes the pa-
rameter area where imitation (myopic best response) attitude
prevails as a result of the coevolutionary process. The noise
value is K = 0.1 for all cases.
pattern makes it viable. One may expect that if we
increase the BR cost of this attitude then the imitation
attitude can gradually invade the whole parameter space.
This expectation is justiﬁed but in a highly nontrivial way.
Figure 3 illustrates that the area of the IM phase expands
as BR is increased but the shape of the phase separating
border could be tangled at intermediate cost values. For
example, at BR = 0.1, S = 0.8 we can observe three con-
secutive phase transitions from IM → BR → IM → BR
phase by changing only the value of temptation T .
In the latter case the explanation of these transitions
is more subtle because it cannot be conﬁrmed by com-
paring only a single pair of competing states. As earlier,
in ﬁg. 4 we have recorded the successful elementary inva-
sion steps at three representative S values in dependence
on T . The explanation of the three transitions at high S
value, shown in the top row, is the following. If we start
increasing temptation from T = 1 then ID becomes more
powerful and simultaneously IC weakens. At the same
time BC remains intact in the BR domain because S re-
mains high. As a result, IC weakens against BC which
involves the decay of the IM phase against the BR phase.
Indeed, ID becomes also stronger against BC , but the for-
mer eﬀect is more substantial, as ﬁg. 4(b) panel illustrates.
Increasing T further the average cooperation level does not
change relevantly. (This plateau was illustrated in ﬁg. 4(c)
of ref. [7] where the basic IM model was studied.) How-
ever, the further increase of T makes ID even powerful.
As a result, ID can invade BC more intensively, which
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Fig. 4: (Color online) The success of elementary invasion steps
between competing attitudes for diﬀerent values of ﬁxed S in
dependence on temptation T . Top row shows the results for
S = 0.8, middle row for S = 0.5, and bottom row for S = 0.2.
As for ﬁg. 2, left column shows the full details of invasion, while
right column summarizes their impacts on the direction of inva-
sion between competing solutions. As earlier, the critical T val-
ues of phase transition points are marked by dashed vertical
lines. Other parameters are K = 0.1, BR = 0.1, and IM = 0.
will reverse the direction of propagation between BR and
IM phases. The last transition can be explained by the
relation of BD and ID players, which becomes important
for this parameter region. While the former remains ﬁt
among BC players the latter cannot utilize high T because
the density of IC players decays rapidly. This is why BD
will beat ID more frequently which causes the victory of
the BR phase again.
At intermediate S value, shown in middle row of ﬁg. 4,
the previously mentioned plateau of the basic IM model
disappears, hence ID players are unable to utilize the con-
stant support of IC neighbors. Consequently, we can ob-
serve only a single transition from the IM to BR phase.
At smaller S value, however, we face a new situation be-
cause small S cannot maintain IC players in the IM phase
for higher T values. This is illustrated by the invasion
rates shown in the bottom row of ﬁg. 4 where the invasion
success of BC against IC diminishes for T > 1.5. Here
BC cannot beat IC players anymore and the advantage of
the BR phase over the IM solution disappears. Instead,
a pure ID phase competes with the previously mentioned
checkerboard-like pattern of the BR phase. Here ID play-
ers can utilize their advantage over BD players who have to
bear the extra BR = 0.1 cost. As a result, the IM phase
strikes back when temptation exceeds T = 1.5 value. As
we increase T further, the disadvantage of additional cost
becomes marginal and the stable support of BC neighbors
will provide a competitive payoﬀ for BD players, which
explains why the BR phase can win again.
The comparative plots of ﬁg. 5 provide a deeper insight
into the consecutive phase transitions as we increase the
temptation value. Here we ﬁrst separated the lattice into
two parts where the solutions of basic models evolved
independently due to the applied parameter values. More
precisely, players using the best-response attitude were
closed in the central domain where this subsystem relaxed
to the BR phase, while players using the imitation atti-
tude were in the surrounding space where the IM phase
evolved. In other words, neither strategy nor attitude
transfer was allowed across the separating borders which
are marked by dashed white lines. These ﬁnal states of
the relaxation, which are the initial states of attitude
competitions, are plotted in the top row of ﬁg. 5. After we
removed the borders, the starting strategy and attitude
transfer resulted in a complete success of one of the basic
solutions. We note that the ﬁnal states are not shown here,
but can be read out from the top row of ﬁg. 4. Instead, we
have recorded the “trace” of invasion steps for every cases.
More precisely in the bottom row of ﬁg. 5 we colored those
lattice sites where invasion happened during the whole
competition until sole IM or BR state was reached. The
applied colors, which are plotted in the bottom of the
ﬁgure, mark the last invasion process at a given position.
Figure 5(a) demonstrates that at a small T value the IM
state is full of IC players who can support each other ef-
fectively and collect a high payoﬀ value. As a consequence,
the IM phase can easily invade the BR phase at this pa-
rameter region. The corresponding ﬁg. 5(e) illustrates that
in this case the most typical change between the compet-
ing states is when the previously mention strong IC player
invades the weaker member of the BR phase, which is the
BC player. As we increase the temptation value, shown
in ﬁg. 5(b), the density of IC players decays which weak-
ens them signiﬁcantly. At the same time ID cannot gain
enough power because the T value is still moderate. As a
result, the direction of invasion turns back and BR starts
propagating. Indeed, the related ﬁg. 5(f) demonstrates
that the BD → ID and BD → IC transitions become dom-
inant. As we already noted, by increasing T further the
density of IC players does not change relevantly due to the
high value of S. This is clearly visible in ﬁg. 5(c), where
the IM phase before the competition remained practically
unchanged. It means that ID players can enjoy undis-
turbed support from IC neighbors but the former is al-
ready armed by a higher T payoﬀ. That explains why the
IM phase can invade again because the ID → BC transi-
tion, marked by light orange, becomes relevant. Lastly,
if we increase the temptation value T further then ID
becomes too successful within the IM phase, hence the
density of IC players decays drastically, as is shown in
ﬁg. 5(d). Consequently, ID players are unable to enjoy the
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Fig. 5: (Color online) Competition of attitudes for diﬀerent temptation values for T = 1.15, 1.45, 1.7, and 1.9 (from left to
right). The other parameters, S = 0.8, IM = 0, BR = 0.1, K = 0.1 and L = 80, are ﬁxed for all cases. The top row shows
the initial separation of the lattice where the composition of best-response players is surrounded by players who apply the
imitation-based strategy update rule. First, invasion across the vertical phase separating lines is forbidden, hence subsystem
solutions are relaxed to the characteristic states which are determined by T, S, and K values. When competition starts by
removing the border between them then either IM or BR phase prevails depending on the T value (not shown). The bottom
row illustrates the trace of elementary processes during the invasion. To distinguish them we used the same color coding as for
ﬁg. 2 and ﬁg. 4.
support of neighboring IC players when they ﬁght against
the external BR phase. BD players of the latter phase,
however, can still enjoy the solid support of BC neigh-
bors due to the checkerboard-like pattern of this phase.
That explains why BD players can beat ID players, and
the BD phase invades the IM phase no matter the former
attitude should still bear an extra cost. This phenomenon
is nicely illustrated in ﬁg. 5(h) where dark green pixels
emerged more frequently. To summarize the surprisingly
diﬀerent outcomes of evolution processes we have provided
an animation (see ref. [32]), where all discussed cases are
shown simultaneously using the same S = 0.8, BR = 0.1
values and the only diﬀerence is the temptation value as
is described by ﬁg. 5.
In the rest of this work we present our observations ob-
tained for the stag-hunt game, where R > T > P > S rank
characterizes the dilemma. The most fundamental diﬀer-
ence from the above-discussed snow-drift dilemma is that
the best-response attitude cannot provide a checkerboard-
like pattern here, hence homogeneous solutions compete
for space [8]. In this situation imitation is more eﬀective
when both attitudes are free from additional cost, because
the IM attitude can extend the full C state to a larger area
on the T -S plane. This is illustrated in ﬁg. 6(a), where
we plotted the phase diagram using IM = BR = 0 cost
values at K = 0.1. If T is too small then defectors die
out very early and both basic models terminate into a full
cooperator state. Increasing T the best-response attitude
does better and invades the whole space. This state is
marked by IM , but we note that the full cooperator state
is still maintained. Increasing temptation further there is
a sharp transition into the full D state that is in agree-
ment with the basic models where uniform attitudes are
assumed [7].
The invasion of the IM phase into the BR phase reveals
an interesting phenomenon that is based on the unequal
propagation speeds of strategy and attitude. To illustrate
it in ﬁg. 6(c) we start the evolution from an initial state
where two stable solutions of basic models are present at
T = 0.35, S = −0.7. More precisely BD players, who are
in the middle of this panel are ﬁghting against IC players
who surround them. When evolution starts BD players
at the frontier change their attitude ﬁrst and become ID
players. This new state, which is not present in the initial
state, is marked by dark red color in ﬁg. 6(d). The whole
propagation process can be followed in an animation we
provided as supplementary information in ref. [33]. It is
important to note that this new state has a special role on
the propagation of IC players. On the one hand, ID can-
not be utilized by MD players, but on the other hand the
former could be more successful than the latter since they
enjoy the vicinity of IC players. This explains why ID
(dark red) propagates in the sea of BD (light red). In-
terestingly, the triumph of ID is just temporary because
they are immediately invaded by IC players. The latter
process ensures a thin protecting skin around IC domain
in a self-regulating way. Put diﬀerently, ID helps IC to
invade the BR phase and after, fulﬁlling its job, ID goes
extinct. This is the so-called “the Moor has done his duty,
the Moor may go” eﬀect which was previously observed in
18002-p5
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Fig. 6: (Color online) Panel (a): phase diagram on the T -S
plane of the stag-hunt game for BR = IM = 0 at K = 0.1.
C (D) denotes the phase where defectors (cooperators) die out
very early. When IM imitation attitude prevails, the system
evolves into a full cooperator state. Panel (b) shows the phase
diagram when IM = 0.02 is applied for imitation attitude.
Here CY C denotes a solution where all available states coexist
due to cyclic dominance. Panel (c) shows the initial state of
competition when stable solutions of basic models (full IC and
full BD) start competing at T = 0.35, S = −0.7, and IM =
BR = 0. Panel (d) illustrates a representative intermediate
state of invasion before imitation attitude invades the whole
system. During the invasion a new state, ID, emerges which
highlights the unequal invasion speeds of attitude and strategy.
Panel (e) illustrates the cyclic dominance between IC → BD →
BC → IC states at T = 0.7, S = −0.5, and IM = 0.02. The
color codes of microscopic states are identical to those we used
in the top row of ﬁg. 5.
a completely diﬀerent system where punishing strategies
were involved in a public goods game [34].
Naturally, if we apply a signiﬁcant cost for the imita-
tion attitude then it looses its advantage and players using
the best-response attitude will dominate. As a result, the
area of full C state shrinks on the T -S plane and its border
shifts to the S = T − 1 line in the zero noise limit, which
characterizes the BR basic model. Interestingly, a moder-
ate IM cost allows a new kind of solution to emerge. To
illustrate it we present a phase diagram plotted in ﬁg. 6(b)
where IM = 0.02 was applied. This diagram suggests
that at some parameter values all competing states can
survive and coexist. This coexistence is based on a cyclic
dominance between microscopic states and a typical spa-
tial pattern is plotted in ﬁg. 6(e). As the pattern suggests
IC (dark blue) invades BD (light red) with the help of
ID (dark red) players. Here the role of ID is the same
as we described above. However, BC (light blue) invades
IC (dark blue) because the former should bear an extra
cost. Lastly, BD (light red) invades BC (light blue) be-
cause the best-response basic model dictates a full D state
at this T -S parameter values. For clarity we also provided
an animation where the dynamics of this states can be
followed (see ref. [35]).
The above description of cyclic dominance explains why
we cannot observe coexistence for too high IM values. In
the latter case the vicinity of IC cannot compensate the
high cost value of ID, hence ID cannot invade the BD do-
main anymore. As a result, the cyclic chain of invasions
is broken and the system terminates into a state where
the population is described by a homogeneous state. This
behavior is in close agreement with our general under-
standing about the positive role of cyclic dominance to
maintain the diversity of microscopic states [36–45].
To sum up, we have shown that the success of diﬀer-
ent strategy updating traits or attitudes may depend sen-
sitively on the actual payoﬀ values which characterize a
social dilemma. In most of the parameter regions we de-
tected homogeneous populations but we can observe sev-
eral transitions between an imitation dominant state to
a population which is described by the best-response at-
titude. Our key ﬁnding is attitudes and strategies may
propagate with diﬀerent speeds which makes it possible
for several interesting pattern formations to emerge. For
example, consecutive re-entrant phase transitions are de-
tected by only changing a single parameter without mod-
ifying the fundamental character of a social dilemma. We
have also shown that cyclic dominance can emerge be-
tween microscopic states no matter there are only two ma-
jor C and D strategies. Indeed, it was previously found
that a two-strategy system can produce similar cyclic dom-
inance in spatial systems [46], but the mentioned exam-
ple assumed diverse timescales during the evolution. Our
present observations emphasize that the microscopic ori-
gin of diversity has just a second-order importance because
every type of microscopical diversity could be a source of
cyclical dominance among competing states.
We note that all the presented results are robust to re-
placing lattice-type interaction topology by random graph,
and can be observed also for other parameter values. We
conclude that considering the simultaneous presence of dif-
ferent strategy updating or learning attitudes might be
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a new research avenue for modeling human behavior in
social dilemmas more realistically.
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